In addition to using theoretical arguments like these, ethicists of belief can connect doxastic norms by appealing to empirical data. At this point Clifford breaks into two examples that illustrate his point.
If everyone always went with the odds then we Critique of william cliffords ethics of not even have professional sports games at all.
There are several points of contention I have with this section as presented by Mr. If that is correct, then another less demanding sort of principle must be in the offing, one according to which at least some beliefs can simply be held on the basis of sufficient evidence, regardless of whether the subject has any beliefs about that evidence.
In the next section, Clifford attempts to address some of my concerns but I intend to demonstrate that he not only fails, but actually begins espousing several arguments which, I think, undermine and ultimately defeat his own arguments up to this point.
There is also a big controversy regarding whether the most fundamental concept here is of degrees of belief or credences. We have seen that our conception of the aim of belief can influence our conception of doxastic norms.
Still others focus on the fact that we can be praised and blamed for beliefs as well as actions that are not under our control, even if there are no obligations on belief-formation. In other words, it is prudent, given your ends, to withhold belief about the source of the aroma altogether, or even to believe, if possible, that he is not smoking pot but rather burning incense in your absence.
Does going with the odds mean that there is insufficient evidence for a long shot? This thread is basically a spillover from the discussion that took place between Post 27 to about Post 62 of this thread: It struck him that his ship was rickety, and that its soundness might be in question.
But perhaps I ought to look into those peoples backgrounds too. P1 We have an epistemic obligation to possess sufficient evidence for all of our beliefs; P2 We have a moral obligation to uphold our epistemic obligations; C Thus, we have a moral obligation to possess sufficient evidence for all of our beliefs.
If evidence is not merely in the head, so to speak, then the possession condition in Evidentialist norms may turn out to be quite complex.
Whether or not these parallels are illuminating, and whether a view in the ethics of belief constrains our options in the ethics of action, is still an open question see KornblithDougherty Here is a link to the complete article: In some places, Clifford seems simply to presume that epistemic duty is a species of ethical duty.
Though doubts had been raised about the ships seaworthiness from both others and within ship-owners own mind, he eventually saw fit to send his ship on her way sincerely believing all was well. In the absence of those conditions, James reverts happily to a broadly Evidentialist picture see Gale, Kasser and Shahand Aikin After this, however, agreement breaks down.
The main distinction here is between hypothetical and categorical structure. One other issue Clifford attempts to bring up is this notion that allowing people to harbor believes which we think that they hold for insufficient reasons is so corrosive as to ruin the entire fabric of mankind as we know it.The ethics of Belief: Argues against Pascal by saying that belief is an ethical choice that must be made with sufficient evidence.
William Paley The Watch and the Watchmaker: Watch to a watchmaker as earth is to God. A Critique of William K. Clifford's "The Ethics of Belief" Authors. Tony Frontuto, College of DuPage. Recommended Citation. Frontuto, Tony () "A Critique of William K. Clifford's "The Ethics of Belief"," ESSAI: Vol.
11, Article Critique of William Cliffords Ethics of Belief illustrate the inherent dangers that lurk in building belief systems on an illegitimate foundation and why you are morally obligated to hold true belief systems. 1. The Ethics of Belief: A brief history Origins of the debate.
The locus classicus of the ethics of belief debate is, unsurprisingly, the essay that christened it. “The Ethics of Belief” was published in by Cambridge mathematician and philosopher William Kingdon Clifford, in a journal called Contemporary mint-body.com the outset of the essay, Clifford.
Notes on Peter van Inwagen's Critique of Clifford's The Ethics of Belief Notes: Van Inwagen’s “Is it Wrong Always, Everywhere, and for Anyone to Believe Anything on Insufficient Evidence?” Preliminaries. William James, the New Atheists, and the Possibility of Agnosticism atheists.
In Part Two I examine Dawkins critique of agnosticism, arguing that it fails because it Given this implicit appeal to Cliffords ethics of belief it is somewhat surprising that.Download